We identify several new tractable subsets and several new intractable simple cases for reasoning in the propositional version of Reiter's default logic. The majority of our findings are related to brave reasoning. By making some intuitive observations, most classes that we identify can be derived quite easily from some subsets of default logic already known in the literature. Some of the subsets we discuss are subclasses of the so-called "extended logic programs". All the tractable subsets presented in this paper can be recognized in linear time. 
Introduction
Reiter's default logic [14] is one of the leading formalisms known in Artificial Intelligence for nonmonotonic reasoning. It has been used for declarative representations of problems in a variety of areas, including diagnostic reasoning [15] , theory of speech acts [12] , natural language processing [11] , and inheritance hierarchies with exceptions [4] . In addition, it has been shown that logic programs with classical negation and with so-called "negation by default" can be embedded very naturally in default logic, and thus default logic can provide semantics for logic programs [3, 7] .
However, while knowledge can be specified in a natural way in default logic, the complexity of answering basic queries on knowledgebases expressed in propositional default logic is very high ( In this work, we focus on disjunction-free propositional default logic. The rules in this logic are precisely those that can be expressed as extended logic programs clauses. Several researchers have presented complexity results on subsets of this class, e.g., [2, 10, 16] . In the work of Kautz and Selman [10] , for example, tractable subsets for default logic were identified for the case where W is a set of literals. In such cases, the conclusions derived from the defaults cannot be used for generating more knowledge from W because W is only a set of literals. The first question we ask is: can we make the subsets identified by [10] more general? In other words, under which conditions can we divide the process of extension generation into two phases: computing all the observations (namely, literals) entailed by W , and then, ignoring W and computing all the conclusions derived using the defaults and the observations alone? We found out that this is possible whenever new conclusions obtained by the defaults cannot generate new facts from W . We set conditions that guarantee this situation and achieved a line of new complexity results derived using subclasses identified in the past.
The other question we had was about subclasses identified in the past which had a strong bias towards a particular literal sign (the sign being "positive" or "negative"). For example, in [10] , it was shown that when W is a set of unit clauses and D a set of Horn rules, there exists a linear algorithm which determines if a given literal appears in some extension of (D, W ). Horn rules are defaults where the prerequisites is a conjunction of positive literals. The question we raise is: If D is a set of dual-Horn rules, that is, the prerequisite of each default is a conjunction of negative literals, do we still get a tractable subset?
As another example, it was shown by [10] that when W is a set of unit clauses and D a set of normal unary defaults, we can decide whether a literal belongs to every extension of the theory in quadratic time. In unary defaults, the prerequisite is a single positive literal. Thus, we ask: can we define tractable default theories with negative literals as prerequisites?
Intuitively, and correctly, the answer to the above questions seems to be "yes". In general, if we take a class of disjunction-free default theories and we reverse the sign of all literals in the defaults and all the literals in W , we get a "dual" subset that lies in the same complexity class as the original. This is an easy consequence of the "Dual Theorem" presented in this paper. As a corollary of the Dual Theorem, we obtain a line of complexity results for default logic, derived from classes that have previously been identified in the literature. The Dual Theorem can also be used as a tool in future studies for discovering more complexity classes of default logic.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we survey some definitions and subsets that appear in past works, and in Section 3 we present the new subclasses that we have identified. Section 4 concludes with diagrams of all the unique new subsets that this paper is the first to introduce.
Preliminary definitions and known results
We begin with a brief introduction to the propositional version of Reiter's default logic [14] , which is followed by some complexity results on default logic published in the past and relevant to this paper.
Reiter's default logic
Let L be a propositional language over a countable alphabet. A default theory is a pair ∆ = (D, W ) , where D is a set of defaults and W is a set of well-formed formulas (wff) in L. A default is a rule of the form
where α, β 1 , . . . , β n , and γ are formulas in L. 1 A default δ can also be written using the syntax α : β 1 , . . . , β n /γ . α is called the prerequisite (pre(δ)); β 1 , . . . , β n are the justifications (just(δ)); and γ is the conclusion (concl(δ)). The intuition behind a default can be stated as "If I believe α and I have no reason to believe that one of the β i 's is false, then I can believe γ ".
The set of defaults D induces an extension on W . Intuitively, an extension is a maximal set of formulas that is deducible from W using the defaults in D. Let E * denote the logical closure of E in L. We use the following definition of an extension, which is a restriction of Theorem 2.1 of Reiter for the propositional finite case [14] :
. Let E ⊆ L be a set of wffs, and let (D, W ) be a finite propositional default theory. Define
E is an extension for (D, W ) iff for some n > 0 E = E n = E n−1 . (Note the appearance of E in the formula for E i+1 .)
A default theory (D, W ) is called consistent if W is consistent. Many tasks on a default theory (D, W ) may be formulated using one of the following queries:
Coherence: Does (D, W ) have an extension?
Membership: Given a literal l, is l contained in some extension of (D, W )?
It has been shown that for the class of propositional default logics the coherence problem is P 2 -complete and membership and entailment for the class of normal propositional default theories are P 2 -complete and P 2 -complete, respectively [8, 17] . Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter have shown that for the subclass of propositional default theories which they call "2-DT", membership and coherence is NP-complete while entailment is co-NPcomplete [2] . The class 2-DT is the class of default theories where W and the prerequisite of each default is 2-CNF; the conclusion of each default is a clause of size two; and each of the prerequisites is 2-DNF (that is, a disjunction of conjunctions of two literals).
Throughout this paper we assume that W is a finite set of clauses and D is a finite set of disjunction-free defaults. That is, the precondition, justification, and consequence of each default is a conjunction of literals. We will assume, without loss of generality for the class of disjunction-free defaults, that each default has a single literal as a conclusion.
A clause is a disjunction of literals. A literal is an atom (positive literal) or a negation of an atom (negative literal). We will often treat a clause as a set of literals. A CNF formula is a conjunction of clauses, and thus can be represented as a set of clauses, or in our representation, as a set of sets. An x-CNF formula is a CNF formula with at most x literals in each clause. A Horn clause is a clause with at most one positive literal. A Horn clause is definite if it has exactly one positive literal. A bi-Horn formula is a 2-CNF formula in which in each clause there is exactly one positive and exactly one negative literal.
Several subclasses of default logic have been identified in the literature. In this paper we look at the dual of them.
Definition 2.2 (Dual)
. The dual of a CNF formula α is denoted by dual(α). The dual of a literal is the literal with the same atom but with an opposite sign. Therefore dual(P ) is ¬P and dual(¬P ) is P . The dual of a clause is the disjunction of the duals of all the literals in the clause. The dual of a CNF formula is the conjunction of the duals of its clauses. The dual of a set of clauses is the set of all duals of the clauses in the set. The dual of a default rule α : Some of the tractable subsets we identify are subsets of ordered default theories [4] . The following definition is from [10] .
Definition 2.4 (Ordered default theory).
Given a semi-normal disjunction-free default theory (D, W ), and a set of literals L containing all the literals in the theory, define ≺ and to be the smallest relations over L × L such that (the sign "\" below is set-difference):
• ≺ and are transitive.
• ≺ is transitive through , that is, for literals x, y, and z in L,
• For every δ ∈ D, and every x ∈ pre(δ), y ∈ concl(δ), and z ∈ (just(δ) \ concl(δ)):
x y and dual(z) ≺ y.
The following assertion about the dual of a default theory is pretty straightforward. Later we need the notion of "default proof" for normal default theories [14] . 
According to [14, Theorem 4.8] , if the default theory ∆ is consistent and normal, then a literal has a proof with respect to ∆ if and only if it is in some extension of ∆. A default proof for a literal is minimal if there is no other proof using a smaller number of defaults. Note that each prefix of a default proof is also a default proof of the literal in the conclusion of the rule used last in the prefix.
The following subsets of default rules have been identified in previous works [10, 16] and are relevant to this paper. All the subsets of default rules described below are disjunction-free.
disjunction-free ordered
The defaults are ordered. Horn The literals in the prerequisite are all positive. The justification and conclusion are the same single literal. unary The prerequisite is a positive literal and the consequence is a single literal. If the consequence is negative, the justification must be identical to the consequence. If the consequence is positive, the justification may include a single additional negative literal. normal unary The defaults are unary and the justification is identical to the consequence. prerequisite-free ordered unary These are ordered and unary defaults with empty prerequisites. prerequisite-free positive normal unary These are normal unary defaults where the conclusion is positive and the prerequisite is empty.
In this paper we are interested in the "duals" of the above subsets. In general, the "duals" are obtained by taking a class of default theories and reversing the sign of all literals in the defaults. Following is an explicit definition of the new subclasses discussed in this paper (compare with the list above).
dual-Horn
The literals in the prerequisite are all negative. The justification and conclusion are the same single literal. dual-unary The prerequisite is a negative literal and the consequence is a single literal. If the consequence is positive, the justification must be identical to the consequence.
If the consequence is negative, the justification may include a single additional positive literal. normal dual-unary The defaults are dual-unary and the justification is identical to the consequence. prerequisite-free ordered dual-unary These are ordered and dual-unary defaults with empty prerequisites. prerequisite-free negative normal dual-unary These are normal dual-unary defaults where the conclusion is negative and the prerequisite is empty.
Known tractable subsets for default logic
The following tractable subsets for default reasoning have previously been identified and are relevant to this paper. 
Known negative results on brave reasoning
We next survey some negative results known in the literature which are relevant to this paper.
The following problems are NP-complete:
where D is unary and W is a set of literals, determine whether a literal appears in some extension of ∆ [10] . (2) Given a default theory ∆ = (D, W ) where W is a set of Horn clauses and D is a set of prerequisite-free positive normal unary defaults, determine whether a literal appears in some extension of ∆ [16] . (3) The problem of determining whether a literal appears in some extension of a default theory ∆ = (D, W ) where W is a set of 2-CNF clauses and D a set of normal dualunary defaults [16] .
(4) The problem of determining whether a literal appears in some extension of a default theory ∆ = (D, W ) where W is a set of 2-CNF clauses and D a set of prerequisite-free ordered unary defaults [16] . (5) [16] The problem of determining whether a literal appears in some extension of a default theory ∆ = (D, W ) where W is a set of literals and D a set of prerequisite-free ordered unary defaults [16] . (6) The problem of determining whether a negative literal appears in some extension of a default theory ∆ = (D, W ) where W is a set of definite Horn clauses and D a set of Horn defaults [18] . (7) The problem of determining whether a literal appears in some extension of a default theory ∆ = (D, W ) where W is a set of 2-CNF Horn clauses and D a set of Horn defaults [18] .
A known negative result on cautious reasoning
The problem of determining whether a literal appears in every extension of a default theory where W is a set of unit clauses and D is Horn is co-NP-complete [10] .
A known negative result on coherence
The problem of determining whether a default theory where D is unary and W is a set of literals has an extension is NP-complete [10] .
In the next section we introduce some new complexity results inspired by the subclasses mentioned above.
New complexity results
We start by introducing a class of default theories where the set of clauses entailed by W can be replaced in advance, before we apply the defaults, by a set of literals. We call this class the class of theories having a set of defaults which is ineffectual w.r.t. W , because conclusions drawn using defaults do not yield more clauses entailed by W .
Definition 3.1 (Ineffectual set of default rules w.r.t. W ). Let ∆ = (D, W )
be a default theory where W is a set of clauses and D a set of unit conclusion defaults. D is ineffectual w.r.t. W iff whenever a literal is in the conclusion of some rule in D, its negation is not in any non-unit clause in W .
Note that for any disjunction-free default theory (D, W ), if W is a set of literals (or in other words, unit clauses), then D is ineffectual w.r.t. W . Also, it is clear that we can decide in linear time whether a set of defaults is ineffectual w.r.t. W .
The first set of tractable theories that we define result from the following claim (the proof of which is straightforward). Let L W denote the set of all unit clauses (or in other words, all literals) entailed by W .
Proposition 3.2. Let (D, W ) be a default theory where W is a set of clauses and D a set of unit conclusion defaults ineffectual w.r.t. W . Then E is an extension of (D, W ) iff E is W * ∪ E , where E is an extension of (L W , D).
Tractable classes for disjunction-free default logic were presented in several papers [10, 16] . The preceding proposition hints that those classes can be made more general. In the following, "a tractable subset" is any subset of CNF formulas known to be tractable with respect to literal entailment (given a CNF theory T and a literal l-is l true in every model T ?), e.g., Horn or 2-CNF theories. It is clear that if a propositional theory is tractable, we can find the set of literals entailed by the theory in polynomial time. In the following, the length of a default theory is the number of symbols used in specifying it.
Corollary 3.3.
(1) (Following [10] , see item (1) The definition of ineffectual defaults is a bit problematic. It implies that in order to insure that a database is tractable, we need to avoid using defaults with conclusions that appear negated in the set of facts, or "world description", W . This restriction prevents us from separating the process of writing W from the process of writing the defaults. In other words, using a certain syntax for the defaults will not guarantee tractability. For every default we write, we will have to check whether the negation of the conclusion is not in a non-unit clause in the knowledge base W .
Nevertheless, the notion of ineffectual defaults is useful. In many cases, an extension computed using only a subset of the defaults is a subset of an extension computed using all the defaults. This is so, for example, when the defaults are normal. In such cases, we can compute first a subset of the extension using a relevant subset of defaults which are ineffectual with respect to W . Sometimes answers to the queries on a default theory can be computed using only a subset of an extension. For example, if we ask a membership query on a literal and we find out that it is in a subset of some extension, we can answer "yes" without having to compute all the extensions. Another way to take advantage of this tractable subset is to incorporate a linear time test in a reasoning system to check whether a set of defaults is ineffectual, and if so, to use a polynomial algorithm to compute answers to the appropriate queries.
The next class we introduce is the class of default theories where W is a tractable set of clauses and D is a set of smooth non-disjunctive default rules which are ineffectual w.r.t. W . Intuitively, a set of defaults is smooth if it can never create conflicting extensions.
Definition 3.4 (Smooth set of default rules).
A set of unit-conclusion non-disjunctive default rules is smooth iff it has at least one of the following properties:
(1) Whenever a literal is in the conclusion of some rule in D, its dual is not in the conclusion of any other rule in D. (2) Whenever a literal is in the conclusion of some rule in D, its dual is not in the prerequisite of any other rule in D.
Note that a set of prerequisite-free default rules is smooth. A set of defaults where all the conclusions are positive literals or all the conclusions are negative literals is also smooth.
The following theorem asserts that if the defaults are smooth and ineffectual w.r.t. W , then once we have the set of all literals entailed by W , we can solve the membership problem quite easily. This theorem will lead to the recognition of more tractable subsets for the membership problem. If W belongs to a tractable subset, we can compute L W , the set of literals entailed by W , in polynomial time. Proof. First, we explain some notation used in the proof. Where l is a literal, l is equal to l when l is a positive literal, and l is a new atom P l if l is a negative literal. Given a set of literals L, we define L to be {l | l ∈ L}. Clearly, L is a set of positive literals.
We can now continue with the proof. If W is inconsistent, then l is in the (inconsistent) extension of ∆. W is inconsistent if and only if L W contains a literal and its negation. This can be checked in linear time and hence the theorem holds in the case W is inconsistent. From now on we assume W is consistent.
Let l be a literal and let ∆ = (D, W ) be a default theory where W is a set of clauses and D is a set of smooth disjunction-free normal defaults ineffectual w.r.t.
Note that H ∆ is a definite Horn theory.
Claim 3.6. l is in at least one extension of ∆ * iff l is entailed by H ∆ .
Suppose l belongs to some extension E of ∆ * . Then there must be a sequence s = δ 1 ,. . . , δ n of rules from D which is a proof of l w.r.t. ∆ * . Let c 1 , . . . , c n be a sequence of definite Horn clauses, defined as follows: Suppose δ i (1 i n) , is of the form
. We define c i to be a 1 ∧ · · · ∧ a k → b . Since s is a proof with respect to ∆ * and L W is consistent, it must be the case that dual(b) / ∈ L W . Hence c i belongs to H ∆ . We claim that c 1 , . . . , c n is a classical logic proof of l from (L W ) . The proof is by induction on n. . We will show that the following holds:
This will establish the claim that l has a default proof w.r.t. ∆ * , and thus, by [14, Theorem 4.8] , l is in some extension of ∆ * . Item (1) clearly holds because l is the conclusion of δ n . It is also easy to see that item (2) holds. It is left to prove item (3) , that is, to prove that L W ∪ { 
is not in L W and hence it must be the case that for some j i, concl(δ j ) is dual(b). Since D is a smooth set of defaults, and condition (1) of Definition 3.4 is not fulfilled, it must be the case that there is no rule in D in which dual(b) appears in the preconditions. So c j must be redundant in the proof of l , because it is used to prove an atom that is never used further in the proof. This is a contradiction to the minimality of the proof of l from H ∆ .
Once we have proven the above claim, it is clear that we can decide in time linear in L W and D whether l belongs to at least one of ∆ * 's extensions. By Proposition 3.2, l belongs to one of the extensions of ∆ if and only if l belongs to one of the extensions of ∆ * . Hence the proof is complete. ✷ The complexity classes introduced below result from the Dual Theorem. This theorem establishes an intuitive assertion: If we reverse the sign of the literals in some default theory, each extension of the original theory is the reverse of some extension of the new theory.
Theorem 3.7 (The Dual Theorem). Let W be a set of clauses and D a set of disjunction-free defaults. Then E is an extension of (D, W ) iff dual(E) is an extension of (dual(D), dual(W )).
Proof. We first establish the following assertion.
Claim 3.8. For any set of clauses W , dual(W
Proof. Suppose W is a set of clauses, and M is the set of all models of W . Let dual(M) be the dual set of M, that is the set of models obtained by taking each model in M and reversing the truth value it gives to each atom. Clearly, dual(M) is the set of all models of
We are now ready to continue the proof of the Dual Theorem. Assume E is an extension of of (D, W ). We will show that dual(E) is an extension of (dual(D), dual(W )). By Definition 2.1, for some integer n > 1, E = E n = E n−1 , where
and l is a literal (remember we assume that each conclusion is a single literal). We take the same n, and prove that dual(E) = G n = G n−1 , where
This will establish the claim that dual(E) is an extension of (dual(D), dual(W )).
We will make use of the following claim:
Proof. By induction on k.
Case k = 0: Obvious.
The dual theorem yields the following new complexity classes for default logic. (1) (See item (2) 
Default theories and logic programs
Logic programming is a paradigmatic way of representing programs and data in a declarative manner using symbolic logic. Originally, the language used by logic programs was restricted to Horn clauses. However, its expressive power was greatly improved after introducing negation into the body of the rules. This negation was generally interpreted as "negation by default", not classical negation, resulting in a grounded predicate being considered false iff it cannot be proved from the program. For an overview of this field, see [9] .
One of the most prominent semantics for logic programs is stable model semantics [3, 5, 7] . Gelfond and Lifschitz [7] have shown how stable model semantics can be naturally generalized to the class of extended logic programs, which uses two types of negationclassical negation and negation by default.
An extended logic program is a set of rules of the form
where each of the r's, p's, and q's are literals, and not is a negation-by-default operator. Gelfond and Lifschitz established a one-to-one correspondence between extended logic programs and disjunction-free default theories by identifying a rule of the form (2) with the default
Given an extended logic program rule r of the form (2), its twin default rule (3) will be denoted by def (r). Given an extended logic program Π , def (Π) is the union of def (r) for all r ∈ Π . Gelfond and Lifschitz have shown that each extension of a default theory defined above corresponds to an answer set of its twin logic program. A similar idea was introduced by Bidoit and Froidevaux [3] . Thus any algorithm that computes extensions of a default theory will also compute answer sets of extended logic programs under stable model semantics. Hence, the complexity results and tractable subsets shown in this paper are relevant for logic programming as well.
Comment 3.15. The Gelfond and Lifschitz transformation from a logic program to a default theory always yields a theory (D, W ) where W is an empty set. According to that transformation, a rule with an empty body translates to a default which is not semi-normal. This limits the applicability of the tractable subsets discovered above because most of them require the logic program to correspond to a semi-normal default theory. We suggest a slightly different transformation. Given a logic program Π , we may map Π into a default theory ∆ Π = (D, W ) as follows:
• D is the set of all rules of the form def(r) where r is a non-empty body rule in Π .
• W is the set of all literals l such that there is an empty body rule l ← in Π .
For example, suppose Π is the following logic program:
According to Gelfond and Lifschitz, the default theory which corresponds to Π is (D 
It can be easily seen that given a logic program Π , E is an extension of ∆ Π if and only if E is an extension of def (Π).
For the reader's convenience, in the following we explicitly state the new complexity results that this paper provides for extended logic programs.
We first give some definitions, most of which have analogous definitions for disjunctionfree default theories. Whenever we say "logic program", or just "program", we mean "extended logic program".
Definition 3.16 (Stratified logic programs).
A stratified logic program is a logic program where it is possible to partition the set S of literals in the program into subsets {S 0 , . . . , S r }, called strata, such that for each rule δ of the form (2): (1) the literal that appears in the head of δ belongs to some stratum S c ; (2) the strata indexes associated with the prerequisite literals in the body of δ are not bigger than c; and (3) the strata indexes associated with the non-believed literals in the body of δ are strictly smaller than c.
It is known that stratified logic programs have at most one answer set that can be computed in linear time [1, 6] . Consequently, we can compute an extension of a disjunctionfree default theory (if it exists) that corresponds to a stratified logic program in linear time.
Ordered logic programs are logic programs that correspond to ordered default theories. Since ordered default theories are semi-normal by definition, the corresponding logic programs must have an analogous property. In other words, a logic program is ordered if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(1) Every rule in the program is of the form
that is, the dual of the literal in the head of each rule appears as a non-believed in the body of the rule. 
is stratified.
The following example shows that the set of ordered logic programs intersects the set of stratified logic programs but none of them is contained in the other. Example 3.18. Consider the following three logic programs, Π 0 , Π 1 , and Π 2 .
The program Π 0 is stratified, but not ordered (the literal ¬P is not in the set of nonbelieved of the single rule of the program). The program Π 1 is ordered, but not stratified, and the program Π 2 is both ordered and stratified. That is, each rule has a single non-believed which is the dual of the literal in the head. For example, Program Π 1 of Example 3.18 is ordinary. Note that every ordinary logic program is ordered. In other words, a logic program Π is smooth if and only if it has at least one of the following properties:
(1) Whenever a literal is in the head some rule in Π , its dual is not in the head of any other rule in Π . (2) Whenever a literal is in the head of some rule in Π , its dual is not one of the prerequisites of any other rule in Π .
Program We will now rephrase the results that were presented in the previous section which are relevant for logic programs. We can decide in time polynomial in the size of Π whether l belongs to at least one of Π 's answer sets. (2) (Following [10] .) The problem of determining whether a literal belongs to every answer set of a dual-Horn logic program is co-NP-complete. (1) (Following [10] .) The problem of determining whether a dual-unary logic program has an answer set is NP-complete. (2) (Following [10] .) The problem of determining whether a literal belongs to at least one answer set of a dual-unary logic program is NP-complete. (3) (Following [16] .) The problem of determining whether a literal belongs to at least one answer set of a prerequisite-free ordered dual-unary logic program is NP-complete. (4) (Following [10] .) Let Π be an ordinary dual-unary logic program. We can decide in time polynomial in the size of Π whether a given literal belongs to every answer set of Π .
The above corollaries show there are three tractable subsets for reasoning with extended logic programs. Membership (deciding whether a literal belongs to at least one answer set) for the class of smooth ordinary logic programs and dual-Horn programs is tractable, and entailment (deciding whether a literal belongs to every answer set) for ordinary dual-unary logic programs is also easy.
Note that the class of ordinary dual-unary logic programs is strictly contained in the class of dual-Horn logic programs. Indeed, although entailment for ordinary dual-unary logic programs is tractable, it is co-NP-complete for the entire class of dual-Horn logic programs.
All the tractable classes of logic programs mentioned above intersect each other. For example, program Π 2 of Example 3.18 is both ordinary smooth, ordinary dual-unary (and hence dual-Horn), and stratified. However, for each of the three classes, ordinary smooth, dual-Horn, and stratified, we can have a program that belongs to one class but does not belong to any of the other two. The next program is dual-Horn, but is neither ordinary smooth, nor stratified, nor ordinary dual-unary: P ← ¬Q, ¬S, not ¬P ¬P ← ¬R, ¬S, not P Q ← ¬P , ¬S, not ¬Q The program Π 1 of Example 3.18 is ordinary smooth, but is neither dual-Horn, nor stratified. The program Π 0 of Example 3.18 is stratified, but is not ordinary and hence is neither ordinary smooth nor dual-Horn.
Conclusion
We have identified several new subclasses of Reiter's default logics and discussed the complexity of coherence, membership and entailment problems in these classes. We have shown the applicability of our results to logic programming. The illustrations in Figs. 1-3 are a summary of all the subsets identified in this paper. The Dual Theorem presented here can be used in future works as a tool for classifying complexities of various subsets of default logic.
All the tractable subsets identified in this paper can be recognized in linear time, provided that the clauses in W belong to a tractable subset identified in linear time. This is a useful feature since a general algorithm answering queries on default theories can quickly test the input knowledge base for membership in tractable classes and thus can apply the most efficient algorithm.
